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Abstract 
The conflict in erstwhile East Pakistan, especially during 
1970-1, was one of the bloodiest and most contested in the 
post-WWII era. While Bangladesh has always called it 
genocide, Pakistan has always denied both the intent and 
the scale of killings. This paper argues that the struggle of 
East Pakistanis to form their own country was reduced to 
a civic-political demand and not an ethnic-based claim to 
distinct nationalism. Revisiting Bangladesh‟s claims of 
genocide based on primary and archival material, this 
paper posits that the violence unleashed in former East 
Pakistan amounted to the systematic wiping out of the 
ethnic distinctiveness of its people through ideological, 
economic, political and military means. This paper 
contends that the recognition of the massacre in former 
East Pakistan during its Liberation Struggle as genocide is 
not only ethically demanded, but this recognition also 
demands a qualitative widening of the existing legal 
understanding of genocide.  
Keywords: Genocide, Bangladesh Liberation War, East Pakistan, 
War crimes, Ethnic cleansing 
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In 1971, one of the bloodiest conflicts of post-Second World War era 
occurred in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. According to different 
sources, anywhere from 26000 to 3000000 East Pakistanis became 
victims of atrocities committed by the Pakistani military and 
paramilitary.  Despite the knowledge of this carnage, there was a 
general disinclination to regard this as genocide from the 
international community and the “U.S. government, for whom 
Pakistan was an ally, suppressed all internal reports at that time 
claiming that it was genocide” (Spencer, 2012). At that time, the 
only international platform to discuss the possibility of genocide 
was The International Commission of Jurists that highlighted 
atrocities committed by Pakistani military and paramilitary.  
The Commission agreed with the claim of „genocide of Hindus‟. 
However, in case of the attacks on Bengalis, the Commission could 
not reach a conclusive judgment. Later, the Secretary-General of the 
Commission noted that “there would be great difficulty in 
establishing the intent to destroy the Bengali people‟ to fit the UN 
definition of genocide” (MacDermot, 1973).This was because of the 
complexities surrounding the interpretation of UN convention of 
genocide.  
The Hamoodur Rahman Commission, established by the post-war 
Pakistani government of Zulifqar Ali Bhutto in 1972, recognised the 
atrocities committed by the Pakistani military and paramilitary 
against Bengalis and mentioned many instances of indiscriminate 
killings through firing squads, burning of villages and sudden 
disappearances (Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report: 
Supplementary report). However, interestingly, the report neither 
acknowledged nor denied the claim of genocide. Since then, a fair 
amount of academic literature has been written revealing the 
genocidal outcome of the conflict. This literature highlights the 
ideological, political, cultural and economic background of the 
conflict and reveals the intent of the perpetrators and discusses 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the genocide in East 
Pakistan (Spencer, 2012; See Akmam, 2002; Beachler, 2007; Farooq, 
2009). 
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The recent book by Sarmila Bose, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 
1971 Bangladesh War, chronicles the 1971 war by reconstructing the 
memories of those on both sides of the conflict. She agrees that 
extra-judicial political killings of many adult Bengalis, secessionists 
or suspected to be secessionists, by Pakistani military and 
paramilitary took place. She further mentions that the Pakistani 
military chose proxies such as “age (adult), gender (male) and 
religion (Hindus)” (Bose, 2011) to pick its victims. However, she 
concludes that these political killings of Bengalis “do not fit the 
U.N. definition of genocide” (ibid.). In spite of mentioning the text 
of the U.N. Convention of genocide, she does not go into its 
intricate details and jumps the gun in concluding. Besides, her 
focus is on the quantitative outcome of the events.  In response, I 
argue here that the basic problem with Bose‟s argument to deny the 
claim of the genocide of Bengalis is that she does not consider the 
ideological and political background of the conflict and that 
instead, her focus is on the secessionist movement only as she 
argued later in her book that „this… is not about the long-term 
historical violence of 1971. Its objective is to focus on the war itself‟ 
(ibid.). This flaw was also pointed out by Naeem Mohaimen (2011). 
For this reason, she sees the killings of Bengalis in anon-combat 
situation as political killings of secessionists or suspected to be 
secessionists. However, the ideological and political background of 
the conflict, which I shall highlight later, suggest that the 
perpetrators of the killings already had the intent to undermine 
Bengali nationalism and seize power, in order to alter the ideology 
and politics of East Pakistanis - Bengalis, even before the 
secessionist movement started and that the secessionist movement 
was an effect of military coercion, not a cause. Hence, the killing of 
Bengalis was not merely political as this also included the aspect of 
ethnicity and thus, fits the U.N. definition of genocide.   
Bose agrees with the genocidal persecution of Hindus but she also 
analyzes this with the same lens of political killings as she further 
labels this as a political killing of suspected to-be secessionists as 
agents of India and insists that the “Pakistan army‟s political 
killings turned „genocidal‟ when religious profiling was used for 
the selection of victims” (Bose, 2011). However, I argue that the 
ideological and political background of the conflict suggests that it 




was not merely political killing but also included an aspect of 
systematic killing of Hindus with an aim of destroying them 
completely as they were considered adversaries of Islam and an 
influence on Bengali nationalism, and thus assumed an enemy of 
the ideology and unity of Pakistan which had no place in the 
perpetrators‟ utopian version of an Islamic society. 
Therefore, the purpose of this article is to reexamine the genocide 
in East Pakistan to emphasise that it was erroneous to have 
considered East Pakistanis‟ demand for self-determination as a 
political, secessionist demand alone. There were larger and more 
systemic factors, rooted in the denial of their ethnic identity, which 
led to the demand and the creation of a new country, Bangladesh. 
I shall start by re-framing the definition of genocide with the help 
of information related to its features, characteristics and nature 
provided by U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (1948), hearings of International Criminal Court 
(ICC) Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and secondary 
sources, especially, the recent book Genocide since 1945 by Philip 
Spencer (2012). The purpose of this exercise is to create a new 
framework that can capture the events preceding and those that 
unfolded in 1971 in a way that depicts both the ethnic nature of 
East Pakistanis‟ national aspirations and that their killing was 
indeed genocide. 
Informed by the proposed template on genocide, I shall proceed to 
highlight the ideological, political and economic background of the 
secessionist conflict and genocide with the help of primary sources, 
the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report and Pakistani 
newspapers, and different secondary sources to trace the intent of 
the perpetrators. Further, I shall discuss three case studies of the 
killing of students (Dacca University massacre), Bengali pro-
liberation intellectuals and professionals (December killings of 
intellectuals and professionals) and Hindus (killing at Thanapara) 
from Sarmila Bose‟s book and will cross-examine them with other 
primary and secondary sources to counter the abject (international 
and national) denial to recognize the massacring of East Pakistanis 
as genocide. 
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What is Genocide? 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(United Nations, 1951)2 is the principal document of international 
law that defines genocide. The Article II1 of this convention defines 
genocide as “any of the following act committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group.” These acts include 
a) Killing members of the group; 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group. 
The convention does not explain what is meant by intent.  The 
convention defines genocide as intent “to destroy in whole or in 
part… a group as such”, therefore, it is assumed that the special or 
specific intent has to be proven for the charge of genocide to stand, 
which is called dolus specialis. (Greenfield, 2008). In recent years, a 
new approach has emerged which asserts that even without prior 
intent if the perpetrators have the knowledge that their act or acts 
are likely to destroy the group then they are guilty of committing 
genocide (Greenawalt, 1999). This approach was used by 
International Criminal Court (ICC) Tribunal for Rwanda, 
considering “that intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even 
impossible, to determine” (Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 1998) and noted 
that the perpetrator “is culpable because he knew or should have 
known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a 
group”(ibid.).With the help of recent court judgments, 
Spencerargues that “intent can be inferred from the actions taken, 
in a sense reversing the order of presentation in the Convention- 
                                                          
 




from act to intent” (Spencer, 2012). Therefore, genocide may not be 
intended, but the outcomes of certain actions may be genocidal.  
The other problem with the existing UN definition is related to the 
quantitative aspect of the process of destruction as there is no 
reference in the text to the number of killed or subjected to serious 
bodily or mental harm at all. It is beyond any doubt that genocide 
means not just the loss of one life but many lives. However, it can 
be assumed from the text of convention that the number killed 
could be as low as one. As ICC Tribunal for Rwanda puts it in case 
of act of serious bodily or mental harm [Article 2(2)]  
… for any of the acts charged under Article 2 (2) of the Statute to be 
a constitutive element of genocide, the act must have been 
committed against one or several individuals, because such 
individual or individuals were members of a specific group, and 
specifically because they belonged to this group. Thus, the victim is 
chosen not because of his individual identity, but rather on account 
of his membership of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. 
The victim of the act is therefore a member of a group, chosen as 
such, which, hence, means that the victim of the crime of genocide 
is the group itself and not only the individual (Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, 1998). 
It can be inferred from the statement of Tribunal that the same 
applies to the act of killing members of a group [Article 2(1)].   
Furthermore, it is not clear what is meant by „in part‟ as the 
Convention does not explain the term. Spencer‟s work explains this 
problem by focusing on the qualitative aspect of destruction rather 
than the quantitative aspect. He argues about the qualitative aspect 
of destruction that,   
it might involve the targeting of particular groups within the 
overall group, without whose leadership the group might find it 
hard to survive… Or it might involve an attack on a group in a 
particular area which lies at the heart of the group‟s existence. 
Without a political or cultural or physical core, the group would 
find it difficult to sustain life, to retain sufficient cohesion sense of 
purpose (Spencer, 2012). 
Robert Melson‟s (1992) work provides another view about this by 
differentiating genocide into two types, “partial genocide” and 
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“total genocide”, depending on the amount of damage done to a 
group of victims. In a total genocide, perpetrators attempt to 
destroy the whole group of victims and partial genocide is a “… 
mass murder in order to coerce and to alter the identity and politics 
of the group, not to destroy it”(Beachler, 2007).  
Throughout this paper, my focus would be on Article 2(1), killing 
members of the group, as denial of genocide, in general, revolves 
around this provision. Therefore, for the purpose of this article is to 
argue that killing of members of a national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group or particular groups within a group or on a group 
in a particular area that lies at the heart of group‟s existence in 
order to completely destroy it or to alter the identity or politics of 
the group could be termed as genocide. 
Different nations: Ethnic distinctions fuelling nationalism 
The state of Pakistan was a product of a bloody division, the 
partition of India in 1947, displacing 12.5 million people and 
leaving one million dead. The partition was a result of the two-
nation theory propagated by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of 
Muslim League and the founder of the state of Pakistan, stating 
that Muslims and Hindus are two different nations as they follow 
two distinct social orders and they cannot coexist in a single state 
(Akmam 2002). As a result, Islam has been the essential element of 
Pakistan‟s national identity and “the Pakistani state has 
increasingly sought to sponsor Islamization both for ideological 
purposes and purposes of legitimization”(Talbot, 2012). 
The two wings of Pakistan, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, were 
separated by 1200 miles but the separation was more than physical. 
The East Pakistanis, Bengalis, both Muslims and Hindus, were 
ethnically, culturally, and economically different from the West 
Pakistanis.  East Pakistan was home to a substantial population of 
Hindus that preferred to remain in the newly independent state 
(Melson, 1992). The Census of 1961 indicated that this population 
was still nearly 18.4% of the total population of East Pakistan 
(Census Organization, 1962) These Hindus were perceived as 
„friends‟ of Pakistan‟s enemy, India, by the ruling elite of Pakistan. 
Together, with their fellow Bengali speaking Muslim citizens, they 
formed a majority of the population of Pakistan. However, they 




experienced substantial inequalities and discrimination (Misra, 
1972). 
The economy of East Pakistan was weak since colonial times, but 
after the independence, no serious efforts were made by the 
Government of Pakistan to develop it. The overall economic 
growth of united Pakistan in the 1960s was significant; however, it 
undermined the unity of Pakistan as its impact was different in 
both wings as the economic growth rate in East Pakistan lagged far 
behind that of West Pakistan because of unjust economic policies of 
Ayub Khan (Beachler, 2007). This trend affected the East Pakistani 
population and the per capita income of West Pakistan, which was 
32% higher than East Pakistan in 1960, was 61% higher by the end 
of the decade (Melson, 1992).As a consequence, the East Pakistanis 
started to think that “West is exploiting their natural resources” 
(Spencer, 2012). Talbot (2012) calls this exploitation “internal 
colonialism” (Beachler, 2007). 
The institutions of military and bureaucracy had most of their 
recruitment from the province of Punjab. The Bengalis were not 
considered for jobs in these institutions as official records of the 
1960s shows that “only 5 percent of Army Officer Corps and 
around 30 percent of elite cadre CSP were Bengalis” (ibid.). Punjabi 
dominated military and bureaucracy, and Urdu-speaking political 
elite preferred to establish a centralized state structure. In this 
regard, the first step was the decision of the judiciary in favour of 
the Governor General – “doctrine of necessity”. This decision 
established the supremacy of the Governor General over 
Parliament (Hussain, 2010). Ayub Khan maintained the centralized 
state system in which main powers rested in the hands of 
bureaucracy and military.   
Cultural integration also accompanied political centralization with 
the aim of de-emphasizing the distinctiveness of Bengali. Urdu, 
which was spoken by a small number of migrants, was made into 
“an essential element of the Islamic nature of Pakistan” 
(Oldenburg, 1985) as claims were put by many advocates of Urdu 
“that the language was part of Islamic culture in South Asia and 
that it was more closely related to Arabic than other South Asian 
languages” (Spencer, 2012). The purpose of this effort was to 
„purify‟ the Bengali culture of the Hindu influence. (ibid.) Many 
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attempts were made by the government to bring Urdu and Bengali 
closer to each other (Beachler, 2007). Meanwhile, the Government 
refused to permit the 100th anniversary of the celebration of the 
birth of great Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore, a Hindu, and later 
banned the broadcasting of his poetry. This act resulted in turmoil 
in East Pakistan (ibid.). The language policy of the Central 
Government also had an economic dimension as the East Pakistanis 
thought, according to this policy, Urdu-speaking West Pakistanis 
would get more government jobs, therefore, “their economic 
interests, already neglected, would receive a further setback” 
(Melson, 1992). Misra (1972) with the help of quantitative analysis 
suggests that exploitation of East Pakistanis by the West Pakistani 
military and political elite could be characterized as “intrastate 
imperialism” and concludes: “through a constant and consistent 
effort of the ruling elite of the country, the eastern wing was 
subjected to political, economic and sociocultural exploitation, 
reminiscent of the traditional relationship between an imperial 
power and colony” (ibid.). 
In May 1969, as a result of these developments, the nationalist 
leadership of East Pakistan proposed a „6-point program‟. This 6-
point agenda demanded the establishment of full autonomy for 
Eastern Wing as proposed in the Lahore Resolution of 1940 
(Schendel, 2009). The main Bengali political party, the Awami 
League took part in the election of 1970 on the basis of this 6-point 
agenda and achieved a striking victory in East Pakistan and an 
overall majority in the country, but failed to win any seat from 
West Pakistan.  According to these results, Awami League had the 
right to form a government. However, the demand for 
implementation of 6 points of Awami League, in order to end the 
exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan, was not acceptable 
to the military and political parties of West Pakistan. Before the 
election, General Yahya Khan had said in a press conference that “if 
the constitution made by National Assembly was not in conformity 
with the five principals laid down in the Legal Framework Order 
(LFO), then martial law would continue” (Dawn, 1970). Following 
the same premise, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, leader of the second biggest 
party who won a majority in West Pakistan but did not win any 
seat from East Pakistan, refused to attend the 1st session of the 
Assembly that was to be held on 3 March 1970.  




Due to the impasse, the military ruler General Yahya Khan 
cancelled the session of National Assembly on March 1. This was 
followed by famous speech of Mujibur Rahman, the leader of 
Awami League, on March 7 in Ramna Racecourse in which he 
urged the people of East Pakistan to struggle for independence and 
freedom but restrained from declaring unilateral independence. 
Further, he laid down a 4-point agenda including withdrawal of 
martial law and transfer of power to elected representatives of 
people and started “a non-violent and non-co-operation 
movement” until his demands were not accepted by Yahya‟s 
regime (Dawn, 1971 (a)). During the movement, Mujibur Rahman 
stressed the nonviolent aspect of the movement as in a public 
procession on 16 March he articulated that “you cannot achieve 
anything in chaos and confusion and violence” (Dawn, 1971 (b)). 
The assessment of three weeks coverage of pro-West Pakistan 
English newspaper, Dawn, suggests that it was indeed a nonviolent 
movement. Even the Secretary-General of International 
Commission of Jurists recognized that “considering the prevailing 
tensions, there had been remarkably little violence” (Spencer, 2012). 
Meanwhile, many rounds of negotiations occurred between Yahya 
Khan and Mujibur Rahman, and later Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also 
joined the negotiations. However, they failed to find apolitical 
solutionto the situation. On 25 March, Yahya Khan secretly flew 
back to West Pakistan without declaring negotiations failed, and on 
the night of 25 and 26 March the military launched Operation 
Searchlight to suppress the unrest. On March 26, the regime of 
Yahya Khan banned all political activities, outlawed Awami 
League, and imposed complete press censorship (Dawn, 1971 (c)). 
As a result, a secessionist conflict began.  
The political and ideological background of genocide 
Helen Fein, one of the pioneers of genocide studies, argues that 
“specific purposes of perpetrator might vary because not all 
genocide were the same”. Therefore, she distinguishes genocide on 
the basis of purposes of perpetrators (Spencer, 2012). I choose two 
kinds of genocide from her characterization, “despotic genocide” 
and “ideological genocide” which are relevant to the subject of my 
article, to interrogate the intent of perpetrators of genocide. In 
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“despotic genocide”, “the aim is to destroy groups which represent 
an actual or potential obstacle to the enjoyment of total power”, 
and in ideological genocide, “there is autopian vision for a society 
in which the targeted group has no place” (ibid., p. 26). 
In case of East Pakistan, the perpetrators had two kinds of 
purposes: first; ideological (ideological genocide); and second, 
political (despotic genocide). The ruling elite of Pakistan, military 
and bureaucracy, assumed “that the people of East Pakistan are 
culturally and racially inferior to those in West” and Bengali 
culture that was under the influence of Hindus is a threat to the 
ideology of Pakistan (ibid., p. 482). 
As a result, as mentioned earlier, many efforts were made by the 
Pakistani government to purify the Bengali culture that resulted in 
resentment in East Pakistanis. However, after the victory of Awami 
League, it was assumed that it was a victory of Bengali culture, 
influenced by Hindus, over the ideology of Pakistan. The editorial 
of pro-Government Urdu newspaper Nawa-i-Waqt highlighted this 
mindset by blaming Hindus for secessionist motives of Bengalis by 
emphasizing the role of Hindu teachers in fostering of Bengalis 
students, 
“85% of the teachers in primary schools in East Pakistan were 
Hindus. They were also a majority in the High Schools, and Hindu 
teachers were also a majority in colleges and universities. This 
means that we had appointed our own enemy for the education of 
a majority of our own progeny... If Pakistan has to remain alive 
then we have to destroy the aspirations of a United India, by India 
and its supporters. Therefore we must, without losing a minute, 
create a long-term plan to counter those who are creating this 
„Bangladeshi mindset,‟ and implement it immediately. And this 
plan can only be predicated on the Ideology of Pakistan. We can 
only achieve this goal if Islam runs in our veins.” (Nawa-i-Waqt, 
1971; translated by author) 
Therefore, Pakistani generals, in order to substantiate their 
assumed cultural, political and ethnic superiority, planned to 
eliminate Bengali nationalists and especially Bengali Hindus. 
Akmam highlights the ideological aspects of the conflict: 




The ideology to destroy the Bengali nation was that they were 
descendants of aboriginal Indian tribes. They do not deserve to rule 
but only to be ruled. Therefore, they were to be crushed in such a 
way that they never could again demand the fruits of election 
victory. The Hindus as the victims had the double negative 
characteristics – they were Bengali and Hindus who were 
considered enemies of Islam and agents of India. So, they had to be 
exterminated (Spencer, 2012). 
This is further strengthened by the findings of Hamoodur Rahman 
Commission which contends that “there was a general feeling of 
hatred amongst soldiers and officers including Generals. There 
were verbal instructions to eliminate Hindus” (Hamoodur Rahman 
Commission Report: Supplementary report). This report mentions 
many instances where officers ordered, verbally or in writing, their 
subordinates to kill Bengalis and Hindus and declares that “the 
attitude of the Army authorities towards the Hindu minority also 
resulted in the large-scale exodus to India” (ibid.).  In this regard, 
the claim of a Major of Pakistani Military is noteworthy as it 
highlights the intent for ideological genocide, “this is a war 
between the pure and the impure . . . The people here may have 
Muslim names and call themselves Muslims. But they are Hindu at 
heart. We are now sorting them out... Those who are left will be 
real Muslims. We will even teach them Urdu” (Spencer, 2012). 
The perpetrators also had political motives. As mentioned earlier, 
the West Pakistani dominated military and political elite of 
Pakistan had been exploiting the resources of East Pakistan and a 
myth was established that since Bengalis are descendants of 
aboriginal Indians, they have no right to rule. When the Awami 
League won the elections of 1970, which the Awami League fought 
on the basis of 6 point agenda demanding full autonomy, it became 
a threat to the ambitions of the military.   
Yahya Khan cancelled the session of National Assembly, which 
was going to be held on 3rd March in Dacca. During the “non-
violent, non-cooperation movement” (Dawn, 1970) of Awami 
League, Yahya Khan conducted “abortive and probably not 
serious” negotiations with Mujibur Rahman (Spencer, 2012). Later, 
without declaring these negotiations failed he secretly left Dacca, 
leaving instructions to suppress the unrest. Hamoodur Rahman 
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Report highlights the intentions of Yahya Khan with a detailed 
analysis of the events surrounding the imposition of martial law by 
him on the 25 March 1969, in these words:  
He [Yahya] did not take over the country in order merely to restore 
normal conditions and reintroduce the democratic process. He did 
so with a view to obtaining personal power and those who assisted 
him did so with knowledge of his intentions. (Hamoodur Rahman 
Commission Report: Supplementary report) 
Later, no serious efforts were made by the Yahya regime to 
normalize the situation, i.e. “initiation of political dialogue with 
representatives of people of East Pakistan‟ and as a substitute, as 
Hamoodur Rahman Report puts it, „fraudulent and useless 
measures were adopted” (ibid.). The target of these measures were 
civilians, workers of Awami League, Mukti Bahini and Hindus and 
these measures included death by firing squads, burning of 
villages, and disappearances by a process called, “Being sent to 
Bangladesh”(Spencer, 2012).  Lt Col. Mansoorul Haq, GSO I, 
Division, revealed that the details of the process of “Being sent to 
Bangladesh” in the Report: “A Bengali, who was alleged to be a 
Mukti Bahini or Awami Leaguer, was being sent to Bangladesh - a 
code name for death without trial, without detailed investigations 
and without any written order by an authorized authority” (ibid., 
p. 26). 
It is noteworthy that the recent judgment of Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh on Abdul Quader Mullah Case also declares this 
“cultural and political genocide” and elucidates the intent of 
perpetrators in these words: 
“The object of committing genocide in Bangladesh…was to 
eliminate Awami League and its supporters in East Pakistan, in 
order to crush the will of majority earlier demonstrated in the 
general election and to turn a majority people into a minority 
forever by creating terror through indiscriminate killing, rape, 
arson, and looting…The acts of murder and violence against the 
people of Bangladesh by Yahya Khan‟s regime and under its 
influence, were committed without any shadow of doubt with the 
express intent.“(Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Criminal Appeal 
NOS. 24-25, 2013) 




Therefore, by keeping in mind the characterization of Helen Fein, it 
can be argued that perpetrators had two kinds of intent: first, 
ideological to impose the ideology of Muslim nationalism in East 
Pakistan; and second, political, to seize the political power to 
further exploit the East Pakistanis. Furthermore, the analysis of 
ideological and political background suggests that perpetrators of 
genocide had the intent to undermine Bengali nationalism and to 
destroy Hindus in order to construct a „pure Pakistan‟ by altering 
the ideology and politics of East Pakistanis and seizing power.   
Dacca University Massacre: Killing of Adult Men 
On the night of 25-26 March 1971, the military launched its 
campaign with Operation Searchlight with the aim to crush Bengali 
nationalism. Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report states the 
account of Brigadier Shah Abdul Qasim about the use of force on 
that night that “no pitched battle was fought on the 25th of March in 
Dacca. Excessive force was used on that night. Army personal acted 
under the influence of revenge and anger during the military 
operation”. (Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report: 
Supplementary Report) Even Lt. Gen. A.A.K Niazi in his testimony 
to Hamoodur Rahman Commission argued that “military action 
[Operation Searchlight] was based on use of force primarily, at 
many places indiscriminate use of force was restored (sic)”. (ibid., 
p. 23) Even Maj. General Umar, then Secretary of National Security 
Council, told in an interview to Sarmila Bose that Operation 
Searchlight was centered on “maximum use of force” (2011).    
In April 1979, Dr. Jon E Rhode who had served as a physician with 
United States Agency for International Development wrote a letter 
to his representative, Ohio Republican Senator William Saxbe. This 
letter highlighted many important facts about the nature of that 
operation:   
“My wife and I watched from our roof the night of March 25 as 
tanks rolled out of the Cantonment illuminated by the flares and 
the red glow of the fires as the city was shelled by artillery and 
mortars were fired into crowded slums and bazaars . . . On the 29th 
we stood at the Ramna Kali Bari, an ancient Hindu village of about 
250 people in the center of Dacca Ramna Race Course, and 
witnessed the stacks of machine-gunned burning remains of men, 
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women, and children butchered in the early morning hours of 
March 29.” (Spencer, 2012)  
These testimonies and witness accounts are enough to suggest that 
during Operation Searchlight excessive and indiscriminate force 
was used by the army personnel who were motivated by the 
feeling of revenge and anger. Dacca University was among first 
targets of Operation Searchlight on the night of 25-26 March. 
Rhode‟s letter narrates their visit to the Dacca University on 29th 
March: 
“. . . At the university area we walked through . . . two of the 
student dormitories at Dacca University [were] shelled by the army 
tanks. All inmates were slaughtered. . . . A man who was forced to 
drag the bodies outside, counted one hundred three Hindu 
students buried there . . . We also saw evidence of a tank attack at 
Iqbal Hall where bodies were still unburied.” (ibid.) 
Sarmila Bose summarises the events surrounding the military 
operation in Dacca University, which had become the centre of 
Bengali nationalism, that “there were both-way-battles and one-
sided massacres in Dacca University that night. It depended on 
where and when. Both way battles occurred in the principal „target‟ 
student halls, Jagannath Hall (the Hindu hostel) and Iqbal Hall. 
Killing of unarmed and disarmed people happened at the halls 
after resistance had been crushed and at the adjoining apartments 
of the faculty.” (Bose, 2011 p. 53) In Bose‟s argument there are two 
important things to note; “resistance” and “both-way battle”.  It 
seems that Bose wants to contend that military‟s action was 
undertaken to crush the armed resistance of inmates of Dacca 
University and when the military entered the university, a two-way 
battle started and which ended with the victory of military. 
However, this argument of Bose contradicts the report of Simon 
Dring, which she quoted early in her book to argue that Bengalis 
abandoned “heroic” version of their struggle in favour of 
“victimhood”. Simon Dring narrates the events surrounding the 
military operation in Dacca University: 
“The supporters of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman talked a great deal 
before the army crackdown last month about how they would 
fight, but they did virtually nothing about preparing themselves. 




They led noisy and often violent demonstrations, but they had no 
organization, no training, no weapons, and, as the army proved in 
Dacca, no real stomach in for war. In the capital the students, 
reckoned to be the militant hard core of the Awami League, lived in 
a similar dream world. They talked endlessly of fighting to the 
death. But they had nothing more than a few rifles from the 1939-45 
war, equally ancient pistols, and some handmade bombs which, 
when the army moved in on March 25, were apparently not used. 
Once the shooting started the jeering, the shouting, the open 
defiance of the military might of Pakistan Government died quick 
death.” (ibid., p. 62) 
Later, through the analysis of military communications, she agrees 
that no automatic guns or grenades were used by the residents of 
Jagannath and Iqbal Halls but only bullets of 0.303 caliber was used 
against the military. She does not mention how the military dealt 
with the fire, however, it can be assumed from the account of Dr. 
Jon that military used excessive and indiscriminative force as he 
had noted that he witnessed the remnants of attack by tank shells 
on student Halls (Spencer, 2012). 
The killing of unarmed and disarmed „male‟ students and faculty 
that took place during the operation puts the number of causalities 
around 44 to 300 (Bose, 2011). The important thing to note in Bose‟s 
version is that military used the proxy of „male adult‟ for killings. 
She also mentions that only killings took place and no wounded or 
prisoners were taken. This suggests that military personnel present 
at the massacre made it possible that no “adult men” survives. It is 
noteworthy that Bose also mentions that at the time of operation 
most of students and faculty had left the university because the 
classes were halted due to the political situation. Therefore, it can 
be assumed that the number of casualties could be higher if more 
students and faculty were present at the time of the massacre.  
Here one query arises: even if there were resistance and both-way 
battles, can excessive and indiscriminate use of force still be 
justified?  Of course, not.  The ideological and political background 
of the conflict highlights that the Government of Pakistan and 
military already had ideological (ideological genocide) and political 
(despotic genocide) intent of genocide in the first place. The 
excessive and indiscriminate use of force and killings of unarmed 
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and disarmed male students and faculty only indicate that military 
personnel were motivated by the feelings of “revenge and anger” 
against East Pakistanis. 
The Dacca University massacre was not only a political killing; it 
was an act of destroying Bengali nationalism. The assault on Dacca 
University, which was a center of Bengali nationalism, with 
excessive and indiscriminate use of force and the subsequent 
killing of all adult men students and faculty, was part of the plan 
by the perpetrators to crush the mainstay of Bengali nationalism 
which was at a peak after the annulment of the session of National 
Assembly. The claim of genocide is strengthened by Spencer who 
argues by explaining the qualitative aspect of the term in part in the 
U.N. definition of genocide, as already mentioned, that “… it might 
involve an attack on a group in a particular area which lies at the 
heart of the group‟s existence. Without a political or cultural or 
physical core, the group would find it difficult to sustain life, to 
retain sufficient cohesion sense of purpose” (Spencer, 2011). The 
students and faculty of Dacca University was certainly that “core”. 
The other important thing to note in Bose‟s account is “adult men”. 
Later in her book, while agreeing with the fact that the Pakistani 
military targeted adult Bengali men she raised a point to strengthen 
her claim that Pakistani military committed political killings of 
insurgents that „nor were all adult Bengali men the target of army 
action‟ as she further remarks that “some Bengali men were active 
supporters of regime … many were not active on either side and 
the vast majority of such men survived the war” (Bose, 2011 p. 82). 
However, it is not necessary that the perpetrators of genocide aim 
to completely destroy their targeted group as the U.N. definition of 
genocide clearly mentions „to destroy, in whole or in part‟, as stated 
earlier this is termed as “partial genocide” according to Melson‟s 
characterization based on the amount of destruction done. In case 
of this genocide, the intent of perpetrators was not to destroy 
Bengalis completely but to alter the ideology and politics that is 
why they only targeted those who had no place in their utopian 
vision of society. The genocidal intent of the perpetrators and 
pattern of choosing the victims suggests that the killing of selective 
Bengalis fits the definition of genocide.     




Persecution of Hindus 
One such incident took place at Thanapara on 13 April 1971. Bose 
(2011), with the help of testimonies of Muhammad Abdus Sattar, 
the only survivor of the killing, and Jinnah, a student of 
Maymensingh Agriculture College whose life was spared by the 
captain of the unit, narrates the incident. She writes that a unit of 
the military came to regain control of Sarda Police Academy, which 
was adjacent to Thanapara, from the rebels. When the unit arrived 
the rebels dispersed. Then the unit approached the riverside when 
someone shot at them. Women and children were sent back to the 
village and all the men were shot. Later, their bodies were stacked 
and disposed of with the help of fire.  
Both testimonies reveal that the captain of the army unit picked 
Hindus and police officers from the captives and shot. Sattar 
describes the procedures of picking: “He asked questions like, 
which ones of you are Hindus? When nobody would answer, he 
picked out people – „you step out – you are Hindu‟. Then- Which 
ones of you are police? When nobody said anything, he picked a 
few again: You – you are police…The men the officer picked out 
were separated from the others and shot” (ibid., p. 101). 
The testimony of Jinnah disclosed the same scenario. After the 
killing of the Hindus and the police, the army captain continued 
the interrogation of others in the same way. Meanwhile, he 
received a message on the wireless. Bose suspects that “the 
instructions seemed to kill them all” (ibid., p. 102). Later, he 
ordered to open fire on all the captives. After examining the 
topography of areas where the killing took place Bose highlights a 
possibility that „the Pakistanis seemed to think that the people 
huddling on the river bank were not villagers, but Indian agents 
who had come across the river.‟ (ibid., p. 103) Further, the 
testimony of Sattar strengthens this possibility. Sattar narrates:  
“the „captain‟ asked, „if you are villagers, then why are you all here, 
hiding by the river?‟ They told him it was because they were 
frightened, but the officer was not convinced. He said, „if you are 
not Indian agents, why did you shoot at us?‟” (ibid., p. 102). 
The case above might be true. However, the pattern of picking their 
victims indicates the specific hatred of the Pakistani military 
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against Hindus as they were picked out first and shot. Thisis 
further strengthened by Akmam‟s argument that „the Hindus as the 
victims had the double negative characteristics‟ (Melson, 1992, p. 
483). 
Boseagrees with the genocidal outcomes of persecution of Hindus, 
but she also analyzes this with the same lens of „political killing‟. 
She further labels this as a political killing of suspected to be 
secessionists or agents of India.  However, I argue that ideological 
and political background of the conflict suggests that it was not 
merely a political killing as this also includes an aspect of 
systematic killing of Hindus with the aim of destroying them 
completely as they were considered an adversary of Islam and an 
influence for Bengali nationalism, and thus the enemy of the 
ideology and unity of Pakistan. The findings of the Hamoodur 
Rahman Commission Report and the process of picking of Hindu 
victims at Thanapara clearly indicates the specific intent of the 
Pakistani military to eliminate the Hindus. Relating to my 
definition of genocide it clearly appears to be a case of genocide 
and according to Melson‟s characterization, the killing of Hindus 
can be termed as “total genocide”.   
December Killing of Intellectuals and Professionals 
During the last days of the conflict, the death squad-style killing of 
Bengali pro-liberation intellectuals and professionals took place. 
Bangladeshi accounts held Maj. Gen. Farman Ali responsible for 
the killing “because a list of names of intellectuals allegedly written 
by Maj. Gen. Farman Ali was found by Bangladeshis after the 
war”(Bose, 2011). Hamoodur Rahman Commission report 
mentions testimonies of Maj. Gen. Farman Ali, Lt. Gen. Niazi and 
Maj. Gen. Jamshed, the Deputy Martial Law Administrator of 
Dacca Division about the alleged killing of intellectuals. All three 
stated that around 9-10 December there was a meeting that 
considered the possibility of arresting of some persons according to 
lists prepared by different agencies, in the event of ageneral 
uprising in Dacca. However, all three generals denied that any 
arrest or killing of intellectuals or professionals occurred 
(Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report: Supplementary report,   
p. 30). 




Bosewiththe help of testimonies of victims‟ families and Dilawar 
Hossain, an accountant, the only survivor of the intellectuals and 
professional killings at Rayarbazar, draws the events surrounding 
the picking and killing of the intellectuals and professionals. She 
mentions that the victims were picked up “by groups of armed 
Bengali youths identified by the victims‟ families as Al-Badr” and 
taken away in a microbus (Bose, 2011 pp. 152-53). 
  Dilawar Hossain recalls that he was kept in a room with others 
and he further mentions that “the floor was full of blood and 
bloodied clothes, everyone in the room had injuries indicative of 
torture” (ibid., p. 155). Later, they were taken to the death squads 
and shot. Many of the bodies were found three or four days later at 
the Rayarbazar and “the bodies had blindfolds and hands tied 
behind the backs‟ and „some bodies never found or identified” 
(ibid., p. 153). 
The important thing to note in Bose‟s portrayal is “armed Bengali 
youths” since she held Bengalis responsible for the killing. She 
suggests a possibility that „in the second week of December the 
Pakistani army was fighting, and losing, a war with India and it is 
possible that while Razakar groups such as the Al Badar were 
created by the army earlier, these Bengali elements had started to 
operate on their own in the final days of the war‟ and argues from 
the testimonies that “the youth who rounded up the targeted 
intellectuals and professionals were Bengali themselves” (ibid., p. 
154). However, her assessment is contradictory to Lt. Gen. Niazi‟s 
point of view that she mentioned earlier in her book that states: 
“the Razakar forces were recruited from among the loyalist 
Bengalis, but „In order to keep them under control and utilize, them 
properly, they were mixed with West Pakistani police and non-
Bengali elements.”‟(ibid., p. 150). 
The cross-examination of these two views suggests that the killing 
of intellectuals and professionals was not possible without the 
consent or knowledge or assistance of Pakistani military and 
martial law authorities. Even if we assume that Bengali elements of 
Al Badr committed this killing solely, then the Pakistani military 
and martial law authorities are still responsible as they created the 
Razakar force in first place with the motive of overpowering the 
Bengali nationalists. What other purpose were they to serve?  
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This killing was also not merely a political killing; in reality, it was 
the last blow to Bengali nationalism by the Pakistani military and 
paramilitary who were losing the war with India. As Bangladeshi 
accounts argue that “these killings were carried out to destroy the 
most valuable human capital that the new nation needed” (Pai, 
2008). Can this killing be termed as genocide?  Again, the claim of 
genocide is strengthened by Spencer‟s explanation of a qualitative 
aspect of the term in part in the U.N. definition of genocide that “It 
might involve the targeting of particular groups within the overall 
group, without whose leadership the group might find it hard to 
survive” (ibid., p. 11)2. These intellectuals and professionals were 
the backbones of the Bengali movement and in fact, had led the 
language movement since independence. Therefore, their killing 
was supposed to have spelt the death knell for the Bengali 
nationalist movement. 
Conclusion  
The applicability of the Rome Statute in the context of the 
International Criminal Tribunal came about with the ratification of 
this statute by Bangladesh in 2010, making it the first South Asian 
country to do so. The intent of this ratification was to equip 
Bangladesh with international law that would permit the trial of 
those, residing in foreign countries, for crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and the like. Therefore, the adoption of the Rome 
Statute by Bangladesh has been largely instrumental in the 
functioning of the International Criminal Tribunal. 
Having said so, the basic problem in denying that the massacre of 
East Pakistanis was not genocide is that it does not consider the 
ideological and political background of the conflict; instead, it 
focuses on the secessionist movement alone. For this reason, the 
analysis of the killing of Bengalis in noncombat situations as 
political killings of secessionists or suspected to be secessionists 
deprives them of the application of the UN definition on genocide. 
However, the ideological and political background of the conflict, 
as mentioned earlier, shows that the perpetrators of the genocide 
already had the intent to undermine Bengali nationalism and seize 
power, in order to alter the ideology (ideological genocide) and 
politics (despotic genocide) of East Pakistanis - Bengalis, even 




before the secessionist movement started and the secessionist 
movement was an effect of military coercion and not a cause. 
Therefore, the killing of Bengalis was not merely a politically 
motivated event but included an ethnic angle to it, making it come 
under the purview of the UN definition of genocide.    
Further, the “partial” genocide of Bengalis occurred as the 
ideological and political background of the conflict, and the pattern 
of selecting victims suggests that the aim of the perpetrators was 
not to destroy the Bengalis completely but to alter the ideology and 
politics of Bengalis by crushing Bengali nationalism, which was 
assumed as a threat to the ideology and unity of Pakistan, and 
seizing complete power.Thiswas achieved through the ideological 
genocide and despotic genocide of the main targets of the 
perpetrators who were Bengali students, intellectuals and 
professionals, Awami League Workers, and Mukti Bahini.    
The assault on Dacca University, which was a centre of Bengali 
nationalism, with excessive and indiscriminate use of force, and 
subsequent killing of all adult men students and faculty was part of 
the plan by perpetrators to crush the mainstay of the Bengali 
nationalism that was at the peak after the annulment of the session 
of National Assembly by General Yahya Khan. The death squad-
stylekilling of Bengali pro-liberation intellectuals and professionals 
was an effort by perpetrators to terminate the intelligentsia of 
Bengali nationalism.  The Pakistani military used „fraudulent and 
useless measures‟ such as death by firing squads and 
disappearances by a process called „being sent to Bangladesh‟ 
against many civilians, Awami League Workers and Mukti Bahini. 
Besides, many instances of killing of ordinary Bengali civilians such 
as the killing of Hindus, police and Bengali civilians in Thanapara 
who were suspected to be secessionists took place. 
It is also unquestionably true that the “total genocide” of Hindus 
was attempted during the time. The ideological and political 
background and the pattern of systematic killing of Hindus suggest 
that the aim of the perpetrators was to completely destroy them as 
they were considered opponents of Islam and Pakistan, and against 
the kind of Pakistan that the West Pakistani elite wanted to 
establish. 




Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report: Supplementary report, 
Retrieved from http://img.dunyanews.tv/ images/ docss/ 
hamoodur_rahman_commission_report.pdf 
Akayesu, V. (1998). Case No. ICTR-96-4, Paragraph No. 523. 
Akmam, W. (2002). “Atrocities against humanity during the liberation 
war in Bangladesh: A case of genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research, 
4(4), 543-559 
Beachler, D. (2007). “The Politics of genocide scholarship: the case of 
Bangladesh,” Patterns of Prejudice, 41(5), 467-492  
Bose, S. (2011). Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War. 
Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
Census Organization. (1962). Final Table of Population 1961. Karachi: The 
Inter-Services Press Ltd. 
Farooq, M. O. (2009).“Islam and Genocide: The case of Bangladesh in 
1971” in J. L. Steven (Ed.), Confronting Genocide – Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam. Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
Greenawalt, A.K.A. (1999). Rethinking Genocidal Intent - The Case for a 
Knowledge-based interpretation. Columbia Law Review, 99, 2259-2295. 
Greenfield, D. M. (2008). The crime of complicity in Genocide: How the 
International Criminal tribunals For Rwanda and Yugoslavia got it 
wrong, and why it matters.  Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 
98(3), 921-952. 
Hussain, E. (2010), “Politics and Foreign Policy in Pakistan”, in Jivanta 
Schöttli and Siegfried O. Wolf (ed.) State and Foreign Policy in South 
Asia. New Delhi: Samskriti, 271-301. 
MacDermot, Q.C. N. (1973). Crimes against humanity in Bangladesh. The 
International Lawyer, 7(2).   
Melson, R. (1992), Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian 
Genocide and the Holocaust. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Misra, K.P. (1972), “Intra-State Imperialism: The Case for Pakistan,‟ Journal 
of Peace Research, 9(4), 27-39. 
Mohaimen, N. (2011), “Flying Blind: Waiting for a Real Reckoning on 
1971”. Economic and Political weekly, 46(36), 40-52 
Nawa-i-Waqt . Editorial, Translated by author, Lahore, 31-August-1971. 
Oldenburg, P. (1985). A Place insufficiently imagined: language, belief, 
and the Pakistan crisis of 1971. Journal of Asian Studies, 44(4), 711-733. 




Pai, N. (2008). „The 1971 East Pakistan Genocide‟, The Indian National 
Interest. 
Schendel, W. V. (2009). A History of Bangladesh. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Spencer, P. (2012). Genocide since 1945. Oxon: Routledge. 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh. (2013, September 17). Criminal Appeal 
NOS. 24-25 of 2013. Dacca. 
Talbot, I. (2012). Pakistan: A New History. Karachi: Oxford University Press 
United Nations. (1951). Treaty Series, 78. New York, United Nations 
                                                          
1Later this article was made Article 6 of Rome Statue 1998 that 
amalgamated crimes against humanity with genocide and established 
International Criminal Court. Rome statue also established the jurisdiction 
of International Criminal Court. 
  
